Probing in Islamic Philosophy:

Studies in the Philosophies of Ibn Sīnā, al-Ghazālī and Other Major Muslim Thinkers

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To Betty

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Al-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the *Tahāfut* and the *Iqtiṣād*

Introduction

*I*n pursuing the intricacies of al-Ghazālī's refutation of the Islamic philosophers in his *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa* (*The Incoherence of the Philosophers*) one can easily lose sight of the task his arguments are meant to perform—hence the danger of attributing to him doctrines to which he may not actually subscribe. One safeguard against this is to keep constantly in mind his stated objectives in writing this work. He states quite explicitly that his purpose is simply to refute, to demolish, not to affirm and to construct. He further declares that after finishing the *Tahāfut* he will write another book, entirely devoted to establishing true doctrine. These are salient points to which we will shortly return.

Full awareness of the *Tahāfut*'s objectives is also necessary for understanding its relation to his theological work, *al-Iqtiṣād fī al-l 'tiqād* (*Moderation in Belief*). More to the point, it explains to a large extent how al-Ghazālī could defend a doctrine in the *Tahāfut* which he proceeds to repudiate in the *Iqtiṣād*. He does this in two notable instances, in the one quite explicitly, in the other by implication.

The explicit repudiation pertains to the doctrine of the human soul as immaterial and immortal. In the *Tahāfut* al-Ghazālī rejects the Avicennan theory that bodily resurrection is impossible, that it is only the individual immaterial soul that is immortal, surviving the corrupted body as a spiritual entity. A doctrine of an immaterial soul, al-Ghazālī argues in effect, need not preclude bodily resurrection: at the resurrection such a soul rejoins the body—a body either reconstituted from its original remains, constituted from other materials, or created by God anew. In the *Iqtiṣād* al Ghazālī explicitly repudiates the theory of an immaterial soul, declaring that he only affirmed it in the *Tahāfut* as a means of refuting the philosophers. Admittedly, as we will be indicating, his statements on the soul in the *Tahāfut* are not entirely without ambiguity. The declaration in the *Iqtiṣād*, however,

makes it clear that the doctrine of the soul he defends in the *Tahāfut* is not a doctrine to which he actually subscribes.

Turning to the implicit repudiation in the *Iqtiṣād* of a doctrine defended in the *Tahāfut*, this pertains to causality. In the well known 17th Discussion of the *Tahāfut*, al-Ghazālī argues against the Islamic philosophers' view that the scriptural account of certain kinds of miracles[1] must be taken as metaphor, not as literally true. According to these philosophers, such miracles cannot be taken as literally true because their supposed occurrence would violate the law of necessary causal connections in the realm of nature. Their occurrence is hence impossible.

Al-Ghazālī argues for the possibility of such miracles by defending two different causal theories, each of which allows their occurrence. The first is the Ash'arite occasionalist doctrine according to which all natural events are the direct creation of God (sometimes through angelic mediation).[2] Nature's uniformity is a habitual course ordained by the divine will and has no intrinsic necessity. Hence its disruption, the creation of the miracle by God, is possible. The second theory is a modified Aristotelian view. It admits causal powers in natural things. Al-Ghazālī, however, insists that the divine act is voluntary, not necessitated by the divine essence. Moreover, divine power is such that it can intervene in the natural order, creating new causal conditions that produce the unique event, the miracle.

In the *Tahāfut*, al-Ghazālī proclaims both theories to be equally possible, without suggesting that they are compossible. In the *Tahāfut*, moreover, he identifies the Mu'tazilite doctrine of generation (*al-tawallud*) with the philosophers' causal theory.[3] This brings us to the *Iqtiṣād* where he rejects the Mu'tazilite doctrine of the generated act and makes no mention of the modified Aristotelian causal theory. Instead, he expounds and defends the Ash'arite occasionalist causal view, declaring it explicitly to be the true doctrine. Since, as we will be indicating, the Ash'arite and the modified Aristotelian causal theories remain mutually exclusive, al-Ghazālī's affirmation that the former is the true doctrine means that for him the latter is necessarily false. The modified Aristotelian causal theory defended in the *Tahāfut* is thus repudiated in the *Iqtiṣād*.

Before examining these issues more closely, however, we must consider more fully al-Ghazālī's objectives in writing the *Tahāfut*. These are given in its religious preface, the four short introductions that immediately follow, and in a statement at the end of the *Tahāfut*'s 1st Discussion devoted to the question of the world's origin.[4] He states that his concern is only with those

of Aristotle's theories—as espoused and interpreted by Alfarabi (al-Fārābī) and Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā)—that contravene religious principle.[5] He insists that he has no quarrel with their mathematical sciences and their logic.[6] He then makes a number of basic points which are essential for understanding his arguments in both the *Tahāfut* and the *Iqtiṣād*.

One of the points he makes is that his aim is to show that the Islamic philosophers have failed to demonstrate their metaphysical doctrine. After pointing out that logic is not their monopoly, he writes[7]:

> We will make it clear that in their metaphysical sciences they have been able to fulfil none of the conditions they have set down for the truth of the matter of the syllogism in the section of demonstration in logic, none of the conditions they set down for the form of the syllogism in the *Book of the Syllogism*, and none of the postulates they set down in the *Isagoge* and the *Categories* which are parts of logic, constituting its preliminaries.

Strict demonstration, al-Ghazālī himself explains,[8] requires that the matter of the syllogism, that is, its premises, should be necessary and its conclusion formally valid. At stake here is this criterion of demonstrability which underlies al-Ghazālī's argument in the *Tahāfut* and his intimately related theory of scriptural interpretation. Before a scriptural passage is to be metaphorically interpreted, its literal sense must be demonstratively proven to be impossible.[9] Hence the philosophers must prove that scriptural accounts of certain miracles cannot be accepted literally: the same applies to the Qur'ānic statements about bodily resurrection. Al-Ghazālī is a rationalist in the sense that he holds that whatever is self-contradictory cannot be enacted. In his criticism of the Islamic philosophers he is only committed to proving that they have not demonstrated their theories, although he also tries to show that some of their theories are demonstrably false.

Another point he makes is that he intends to confine himself to refuting, not affirming and constructing doctrine. "I do not enter into [argument] objecting to them," he writes, "save as one who demands and denies, not as one who claims and affirms."[10] The same idea is repeated with amplification at the end of the *Tahāfut*'s 1st Discussion. Al-Ghazālī reports a possible criticism against his method of refuting the philosophers and answers it. He writes[11]:

> If it is said, "in all the objections, you have resorted to opposing difficulties with [other] difficulties and have not resolved the difficulties [the philosophers] brought forth," we say:

Objection inescapably shows the falsity of what is said; and the problematic facet of the difficulty they raise is resolved by what is implied in the objection and what is being asked. In this book we have committed ourselves only to rendering their doctrine murky and the modes of their proofs dusty wherewith we show their incoherence.

We have not endeavored to defend a particular doctrine and as such have not departed from the objective of this book. We will not argue exhaustively for the doctrine of the temporal origination [of the world], since our purpose is to refute their claim of knowing [its] pre-eternity.

As regards affirming the true doctrine, we will write a book concerning it after completing this one—if success, God willing, comes to our aid—and will name it, "The Principles of Beliefs." We will engage in it in affirmation just as we have devoted ourselves in this book to destruction.

In this passage, after making it clear that his aim in the *Tahāfut* is simply to refute the philosophers, he expands on this with two important statements. The first, a reiteration of a point he had actually made earlier,[12] is that his *Tahāfut* is not intended to defend any particular doctrinal viewpoint. The second is that he will devote a separate book for establishing true doctrine. (As will be reiterated shortly, the immediate concern is with the question of the world's origination.) Both statements call for comment.

Averroes (Ibn Rushd) in his *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* (*The Incoherence of the Incoherence*), his philosophical reply to al-Ghazālī's *Tahāfut*, repeatedly refers to the arguments used by al-Ghazālī as Ashʿarite.[13] To a large extent, Averroes is justified in this. It can be shown that more often than not, al-Ghazālī in his *Tahāfut* argues from an Ashʿarite theological base and makes categorical assertions that are Ashʿarite.[14] At the same time, as with the very questions with which we are concerned—bodily resurrection and causality—he defends non-Ashʿarite positions. He defends them, as his statements in the *Iqtiṣād* reveal, for the sake of argument, as a means of refuting his opponents. Nonetheless, however, he defends them.

Turning to his statement that he intends to write a book "after completing this one," that is, the *Tahāfut*, wherein he will establish the true doctrine, the title he gives it poses a minor problem of identification. In the *Tahāfut*, the proposed title is *Qawāʿid al-ʿAqāʾid* (*The Principles of Beliefs*). As is well known, his Ashʿarite work bearing this title forms one of the books of his voluminous *Ihyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn* (*The Revival of the Sci-*

ences of Religion), which he wrote after leaving Baghdad. But the work that really fulfils the purpose stated in the *Tahāfut* is his more comprehensive Ashʿarite work, *al- Iqtiṣād*. All the indications (and they are quite compelling) are that the *Iqtiṣād*, rather than the *Qawāʿid*, is the *Tahāfut*'s sequel. Significantly, in introducing the *Iqtiṣād*, he tells us that its concern is *qawāʿid al-ʿaqīda*, (the principles of belief) and *qawāʿid ʿaqāid ahl al-sunna* (the principles of belief of those who follow the sunna),[15] although he does not use any such wording in its title. The *Iqtiṣād* refers directly to the *Tahāfut* and in its language and spirit is very close to it. This Ashʿarite work was written shortly after the *Tahāfut* when al-Ghazālī was still at the Niẓāmiyya in Baghdad.[16] What, however, is most telling is the context in which he states his intention to write a work wherein he will affirm the true doctrine. As can be seen from the quotation above, the direct reference is to the doctrine of the world's pre-eternity which he rejects, promising to argue "exhaustively" for the true doctrine, that of the world's temporal origination, in the work he proposes to write. Apart from a brief argument, almost in passing, supporting the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* in the *Qawāʿid*, there is no exhaustive treatment therein. The more detailed treatment is given in the *Iqtiṣād*.

One should at this point also emphasize that, despite al-Ghazālī's arguments that the role of *kalām* is primarily to defend Islamic belief against heretical innovations, and that *kalām* by itself is no substitute for *kashf*, mystical revelation that leads to *maʿrifa*, gnosis, he never repudiates or belittles the *Iqtiṣād*. On the contrary, he held the *Iqtiṣād* in high esteem. In his late work, *Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn*,[17] he declares the superiority of the *Iqtiṣād* to what one encounters in the official works of *kalām*, being "more intense in ascertainment (*ablagh fī al-tahqīq*)" and "closer to knocking at the doors of gnosis (*wa aqrab ilā qarʿi abwāb al-maʿrifa*)."[18]

Bodily Resurrection

Al-Ghazālī devotes the 20th (and last) Discussion of his *Tahāfut* to the question of bodily resurrection. In it he endeavors to refute the philosophers' arguments that such resurrection is impossible. Bodily resurrection, he argues, is possible. Hence the scriptural accounts of it must be taken literally. Their literal acceptance, however, he argues, does not mean the exclusion of additional non-physical rewards and punishments that God can

decree. In arguing in this fashion, al-Ghazālī tries to show that a doctrine of bodily resurrection is not incompatible with a doctrine of an immaterial soul. His defense of this position, which is ardent and detailed, and the ambiguity of certain statements he makes, give the impression that in the *Tahāfut* he subscribes to the doctrine of an immaterial soul.

To put the issue in proper perspective, we will first turn briefly to his position expressed in the 18th and 19th Discussions and then to some of the materialistic theories of the human soul held in medieval Islam. In the 18th Discussion, he argues at length to show that the philosophers have failed to demonstrate that the soul is immaterial. Reason only shows that its immateriality is possible and hence within God's power to enact. It does not prove that its immateriality is necessary. In the first of ten Avicennan proofs for the soul's immateriality which al-Ghazālī presents and endeavors to refute, he indicates that a theological (*kalām*) material doctrine of the soul, namely that it is a material atom, is also possible.[19] In the 19th Discussion, he argues in a similar way to show that the philosophers have failed to demonstrate that the soul is immortal.

Al-Ghazālī's brief mention of a *kalām* atomist theory of the soul in the 18th Discussion suggests the larger context in which his defence of bodily resurrection in the 20th Discussion has to be understood. Most of the medieval Islamic speculative theologians, the *mutakallimūn*, were materialist atomists, upholding a materialist doctrine of the soul. There were exceptions, however, the Muʿtazlite Muʿammar (d. ca. 835), for example, was an atomist, but not a materialist in his conception of the soul—he held it to be a spiritual, non-material atom.[20] Al-Naẓẓām (d.ca. 845), on the other hand, rejected the atomism of his fellow theologians, but upheld a materialist doctrine of the soul. He maintained that the soul is a subtle material substance diffused throughout the body.[21] His concept of the soul seems identical with what was to become a traditional Islamic doctrine of the soul as a material substance diffused throughout the physical body, but different from it in "quiddity," *al-māhiyya*.[22] The Ashʿarite al-Juwaynī (d. 1085), al-Ghazālī's teacher, retains the concept of a material soul or spirit diffused throughout the sensible body, but seems to interpret this in atomist terms. He thus maintains that the spirit (*al-rūḥ*) consists of "subtle bodies," *ajsām laṭīfa* interlaced with sensible bodies. Spirit and life, however, are not identical. Life, he maintains, is an accident that animates a substance and also animates the spirit.[23]

Why then this insistence on the materiality of the soul? At heart is the issue of the relatedness of an immaterial spirit or soul to what is spatial, the body. This is not only problematic philosophically, but, for many Muslims, is difficult to reconcile with the traditional Islamic belief regarding the fate of the soul after death, particularly in the interim between death and the resurrection. How can an immaterial, non-spatial, spirit return to the grave to be questioned by the angels, *munkir* and *nakīr*? How can such an immaterial soul, when it is the soul of the wicked, undergo the torment of the grave, ʿ*adhāb al-qabr*? Again, the spirits of the righteous, as al-Juwaynī, re-echoing the well known *ḥadīth*, puts it, are lifted "in the crops of green birds to paradise."[24] This is spatial language. For many Muslims, statements about human souls that spatially exist nowhere are incomprehensible.

It is with these issues in mind, that we will now turn to some of al-Ghazālī's ambiguous statements that precede his defence proper of a doctrine of bodily resurrection. A first ambiguity occurs in the 18th Discussion devoted to refuting ten Avicennan arguments for the soul's immateriality. Before launching his refutations, al Ghazālī gives a summary of Avicenna's theory of the soul. One notes that he discusses the division of the rational soul into theoretical and practical, without stating explicitly that this rational soul is immaterial. Immediately after giving his summary, he writes:[25]

> There is nothing in what [the philosophers] have mentioned that must be denied in terms of the religious law. For these are observed matters which God, exalted be He, has ordained to run in a habitual course (*ajrā Allah al-ʿāda bihā*).
>
> We only want now to object to their claim of knowing the soul to be a self-subsisting substance through rational demonstration. We do not offer against their claim the objection of one who deems this to be remote from the power of God, the exalted, or perceives that the religious law has brought forth what is contrary to it.
>
> Indeed, we will perhaps (*bal rubbamā*) show in detailing the explanation of the resurrection and the after-life that the law gives credence to it. We deny, however, their claim that reason alone indicates this and that there is no need in it for the religious law.

Of particular significance in the above passage is the reference to the habitual course of nature ordained by God. This is a reference al-Ghazālī often makes, sometimes in his discussions of an Avicennan theory. It signals that such a theory is to be reinterpreted in occasionalist terms whereby

it is divested of the notion of inherent necessity.[26] But the extent of this interpretation as far as the Avicennan theory of a rational soul is concerned is not clear. Does it mean the substitution of an Ash'arite material rational soul, for an Avicennan immaterial rational soul?

Although there are indications in the *Tahāfut* that al-Ghazālī subscribes to such a substitution,[27] what immediately follows the reference to the habitual course of nature in the above passage suggests that in this passage, at least, he does not intend this substitution. A doctrine of an immaterial soul he proclaims, in effect, is possible and within God's power to enact. Furthermore, it is not denied by the religious law. In fact, one can find support for it in the law. At the same time, there is a note of tentativeness when he suggests that he will "perhaps" indicate this support.

Another ambiguity occurs in the first part of the 20th Discussion in which al-Ghazālī begins by summing up Avicenna's eschatology that confines eternal rewards and punishments to the spiritual, non-physical, realm. Al-Ghazālī, who insists on physical pleasures and pains in the hereafter but does not deny additional spiritual rewards and punishments, writes:[28]

> Most of these things [stated by the philosophers] are not contrary to the religious law. For we do not deny the existence in the hereafter of kinds of pleasures superior to the sensible. Nor do we deny the survival of the soul after separation from the body. But we know this through the religious law since it proclaims the resurrection and the resurrection can only be understood in terms of the survival of the soul.

The soul, hence, must survive the body if resurrection is to take place. But what kind of soul is this? Is it material or immaterial? Al-Ghazālī does not specify. In what follows, however, he chooses to defend a theory of bodily resurrection that also upholds a doctrine of an immaterial soul. This fortifies the impression that he is subscribing to a doctrine of the soul's immateriality in conjunction with bodily resurrection.

According to al-Ghazālī, the philosophers hold that the supposition of bodily resurrection entails any one of three doctrines. Each of these they then try to show is false. Since these are the only three doctrines entailed by it, they argue in effect, the affirmation of bodily resurrection is false.

The first of these doctrines is associated with the *kalām*.[29] It rejects the notion of an immaterial soul, identifies the self with the body and holds life to be an accident that inheres in the body. When God ceases to create the accident life, death takes place. According to one version of this doctrine,

death means the utter annihilation of both body and the accident life, the resurrection being the recreation of both. Another version, however, holds that the body is not annihilated, but is decomposed into earth. At the resurrection its parts are reassembled and the accident, life, recreated in the reassembled body. The philosophers' main objection, applicable to both versions of this doctrine, is that it is not really a doctrine of resurrection. *Al-ma'ād*, that is, "the return" into existence of what had previously existed and is no more is not possible. What the theologians think of as the resurrected body can only be a replica of what had existed originally, not the actual thing.[30]

The second and third doctrines affirm the existence of an individual immaterial soul that survives the body. Both maintain that the soul at the resurrection rejoins the body. The second doctrine, however, holds that the resurrected body is reassembled from the very original parts that had been decomposed. The philosophers argue that this cannot be since the decomposed parts become parts of plants, animals and other humans.[31] The third doctrine does not insist that the body is reassembled from its original parts, but can be formed from any kind of earth whatsoever. To this the philosophers raise two objections.[32] The first is based on their doctrine of an eternal world. The world being eternal, the number of individual souls that survive the body must be infinite. The amount of matter in the sublunar world, however, is finite. It is not sufficient to form bodies that can rejoin an infinity of individual souls.[33] The second objection is that this third doctrine leads to a form of transmigration. Transmigration is false because the individual soul is created at birth, the specific bodily composition necessitating the creation of that particular soul. Transmigration means that in addition to this necessarily induced soul, there would be another, which is false. Bodily resurrection means that the earth which is to form the resurrected body, would have to acquire a bodily composition akin to that of the original sperm that induces the soul to rejoin it. The same soul would then be in two bodies (at two different times) and this is transmigration, or else, two souls would be in the reformed body.[34]

Al-Ghazālī chooses to defend that last of these three doctrines.[35] The philosophers first objection to it is based on the doctrine of the world's preeternity, which he had refuted, while the second objection is also based on a doctrine he had rejected, namely that the creation of a particular kind of soul is necessitated.[36] To the possible rejoinder to his answer to the second objection, namely that it is only this philosophical theory that can explain why

different individual souls are created with different individual bodies, al-Ghazālī argues that there are other factors, known to God, that explain this.[37] He then argues at length to refute another objection.[38] This is the objection that even if souls were to rejoin bodies in the hereafter, the decomposed bodies must undergo a lengthy process of evolution before the souls can rejoin them. Al-Ghazālī answers that, even if the need of evolution is admitted, the evolution would be instantaneous, explicable in terms of one of the two causal theories, the occasionalist and the modified Aristotelian, he had argued for in the 17th Discussion as being equally possible.[39]

His answers to the philosophers' objections to the third doctrine are certainly of interest in their own right. Their detailed discussion, however, is beyond our scope here. More to our purpose is his very choice of defending the third, rather than the first, the *kalām* doctrine. Al-Ghazālī, in effect, postpones endorsing and defending the first doctrine to the *Iqtiṣād* as we will presently see. In this he is entirely consistent with his declared intention in the *Tahāfut* of devoting this work to refuting the philosophers and of devoting another to the defence and the establishing of true doctrine. The way he introduces his defence of the third doctrine deserves attention. He writes:[40]

> The objection is to say: "With what [argument] would you deny someone who chooses the last alternative, maintaining the view that the soul endures after death, it being a self-subsisting substance?" For this does not contradict the religious law. On the contrary, the religious law points to this in the utterance of God, exalted, be He: "Do not reckon that those killed in the way of God are dead, they are living with their Lord, provided for, rejoicing . . ." and in the saying of the prophet (peace be on him): "The spirits of the righteous are in the crops of green birds that hang beneath the Throne."

The religious quotations in the above passage leave the reader with the strong impression that al-Ghazālī actually subscribes to the doctrine of an immaterial soul. A close look at the opening sentence, however, shows that there is no commitment to such a doctrine. The approach is dialectical. Al-Ghazālī defends this doctrine for the sake of argument, for the sake of refuting the philosophers.

This is explicitly confirmed by the *Iqtiṣād* to which we must now turn. The confirmation occurs as part of al-Ghazālī's endorsement of the *kalām* doctrine that denies that the soul is immaterial. He defends it against the

major objection to it, mentioned earlier, reported in the *Tahāfut*. This is an objection which Avicenna had raised. According to Avicenna, whatever had at one time existed but then absolutely ceased to exist cannot come into existence again: what is conceived to be such a resurrected thing would only be a replica (*mithl*) of the original, not the original existent.[41]

As opposed to this, al-Ghazālī in the *Iqtiṣād* defines the resurrection as the recreation of the very thing that had previously existed.[42] It is a second creation of the very existent that had had a first creation. The question then arises about what had ceased to exist and what is being recreated. It is here that the *kalām* doctrine of bodily resurrection that denies the soul's immateriality mentioned in the *Tahāfut* appears again. As reported in the *Tahāfut*, this doctrine has two versions. These two versions are now discussed in the *Iqtiṣād*. According to one version, it is only the accidents that cease to exist and are then resurrected; according to the other, both accidents and the atoms (*al-jawāhir*) that constitute the body cease to exist and are then resurrected. There is nothing conclusive in the religious law, al-Ghazālī tells us, that favors one of these versions, rather than the other. Both are possible.

The first version, however, has in turn, two interpretations. Both interpretations affirm that after death the body "remains informed with the form of earth, for example, life, color, moisture, composition, shape and a number of accidents would no longer exist."[43] The resurrection would consist in the return of these accidents to the body. But in what sense of return? Accidents, according to the Ashʿarites, in the normal course of events, do not persist for more than a moment. They are constantly being recreated, the body giving the existent its identity and continuity. Some theologians, however, adopt the interpretation that the recreated accident is not the original accident, but only a *replica* of it. The same applies to the accident that rejoins the body in the hereafter. Al-Ghazālī does not accept this interpretation, supporting a second interpretation, according to which what is recreated is the original accident and not something similar to it. He, however, refrains from refuting the first interpretation, on the grounds that this will prolong the discussion unnecessarily.

Al-Ghazālī then turns to the second version of the *kalām* doctrine according to which both the body and its accidents undergo annihilation and subsequent resurrection. He expresses the main criticism against the doctrine—the criticism raised by Avicenna—in the form of a question and answers it. He writes:[44]

If it is said, "By what is the resurrected thing (*al-mu ʿād*) differentiated from what is similar to (*mithl*) the [thing created] first (*al-awwal*), and what is the meaning of your saying that the resurrected thing is the first [created thing] itself (*huwa ʿayn al-awwal*) when the non-existent no longer has an identity in the concrete (*ayn*) for it to be resurrected?," we say:

The non-existent divides in God's knowledge into that for which there has been a previous existence [and that for which there has been no such existence], just as non-existence in the eternal past divides into that which will have existence and that which God, exalted be He, knows will not exist. This is a division in God's knowledge which one cannot deny, [His] knowledge being all-embracing, His power vast, [accommodating].

The meaning of "to resurrect" is to exchange existence for a non-existence that had been preceded by existence, whereas the meaning of the similar (*al-mithl*) is to initiate (*an yukhtara ʿa*) existence for a non-existence not preceded by existence.

It is thus from the standpoint of divine knowledge that al-Ghazālī answers the difficulties posed by the *kalām* doctrine of bodily resurrection. Our interpretation of this important passage is as follows:

God has knowledge of all existents that will occur in the future. These divide into two classes. The first are those that already had had a former existence created by God, a previous existence in the past. When annihilated, after their first existence, they do not lose their identity, which is preserved, as it were, in divine knowledge. They can thus be recreated, resurrected. What is recreated is the identical thing that once existed, not its replica. The second class of future existents are those which had never had a previous existence. A replica of a resurrected thing would belong to this class. It is distinct from the resurrected thing in that it never had a past existence. The distinction between the two is real, objective, and known to God.

After further comment, referring to the whole question of bodily resurrection, al-Ghazālī writes:[45]

> We have treated this problem in detail in the *Kitāb al-Tahāfut*, adopting in it in refuting the philosophers' doctrine the view that affirms[46] the immortality of the soul—which according to them has no position in space—and that allows the resumption of its management of the body, regardless of whether or not such a body is the same as the original human body.

> This, however, is a consequence [we made logically incumbent on them to accept] that does not agree with what we believe (*wa dhālika ilzāmun lā yuwafiqu mā na ʿtaqiduhu*). For that book was written for the purpose of refuting their doctrine, not for the purpose of establishing true doctrine.

The above statement speaks for itself. Al-Ghazālī's declaration that in the *Tahāfut* he defended a doctrine that acknowledges the immateriality of the human soul simply for the sake of argument is quite explicit. This is not the doctrine he holds to be true. The true doctrine is that of the *kalām* (in one of its versions).[47] This approach of defending a view as possible, but not true, simply for the sake of argument, is all important for understanding his position on causality.

Causality

In the *Tahāfut*, al-Ghazālī argues for the possibility of two causal views, the occasionalist Ashʿarite doctrine, and a modified Aristotelian theory. Although mutually exclusive, he holds in effect that each in and by itself is possible. As we hope to show, however, he adopts the modified Aristotelian theory only for the sake of argument, as one way of refuting the philosophers' contention that certain types of miracles are impossible and that hence the scriptural language reporting them must be taken as metaphor. This finds conclusive confirmation in the *Iqtiṣād* where al-Ghazālī proclaims the Ashʿarite occasionalist doctrine as the true one. In other words, just as in his treatment of bodily resurrection, he defends a doctrine as possible, but does not hold it to be true, he does the same in his treatment of the modified Aristotelian causal theory. To see this, we must begin with a brief review of the arguments of the 17th Discussion of the *Tahāfut* then turn to the *Iqtiṣād*.

Al-Ghazālī begins the 17th Discussion with the declaration that the "connection between what is habitually believed to be a cause and what is habitually believed to be an effect is not necessary." But in the case of any two things that are not identical, he goes on, provided "neither the affirmation or the negation of the one entails the affirmation or negation of the other, the existence or non-existence of the one does not render the existence or nonexistence of the other necessary."[48]

This provision, which at first sight may seem redundant, has a specific purpose. Al-Ghazālī here is setting aside relationships between concomitants that are necessary but not causal. He wants to exclude for example such a spatial relationship between A and B, where A is either above B or to the right of it, from which it would necessarily follow that in the first alternative B is below A and in the second that it is to the left of it.[49] Uppermost in his mind, however, is the relation between the attributes, particularly the coeternal divine attributes. "Will," as he tells us, "entails knowledge necessarily."[50] Again, the divine attribute of life is a necessary condition for the attributes of will and knowledge. Will and knowledge cannot exist without life. But this does not mean that the eternal attribute of life is the cause of the eternal attributes of will and knowledge.[51] Al-Ghazālī does not want to dismiss necessary relationships between existents. But causality, as customarily believed to obtain in the realm of nature, is not one of them.

If then the relation between what is habitually regarded as the natural cause and its effect is not necessary, each can exist without the other. Its independent existence is possible. Since everything possible lies within divine power, God is able "to create death without decapitation, to continue life after decapitation and so on to all connected things."[52] Al-Ghazālī then gives his famous example of the piece of cotton that burns when touched by fire. An opponent may claim that the agent of burning is the fire, "it being an agent by nature, not by choice." Al-Ghazālī rejects this:[53]

> The one who enacts the burning by creating blackness in the cotton, disintegration in its parts and making it tinder or ashes is God, exalted be He, either through the mediation of the angels or without mediation. As for fire, which is inanimate, it has no action; for what proof is there that it is the agent? They have no proof other than observing the occurrence of burning at the [juncture of] contact with fire. Observation, however, [only] shows the occurrence [of burning] at [the time of the contact with fire], but does not show the occurrence [of burning] by [the fire].

After elaborating on this point, al-Ghazālī then introduces another opposing view. This is the view that events are emanations from the celestial principles:[54]

> The second position belongs to those who admit that these temporal events emanate from the principles of temporal events, but that the preparation of the reception of the forms comes

about through these present, observed causes. These principles, however, [they maintain], are also [such that] things proceed from them necessarily and by nature, not by way of deliberation and choice, in the way light proceeds from the sun, the receptacles differing in their reception because of the differences of their disposition.

Thus, according to this view, the observed causes in nature are preparatory. They render terrestrial things disposed for the reception of emanations from the celestial principles. Moreover, the principles themselves act by necessity. Hence, once again, certain of the miracles reported by the scriptures are impossible and their scriptural accounts have to be taken as metaphor.

Al-Ghazālī rejects this view, adopting in refuting it two alternative answers, the second of which introduces the modified Aristotelian causal theory. It should be emphasized, in anticipation, that the second answer by no means abrogates the first and is not intended to do so. It is simply another possible answer to the philosophers position. To turn then to the first answer, al-Ghazālī writes: "We do not concede that the principles do not act by choice and that God, exalted be He, does not act voluntarily." Then returning to the example of the cotton touching fire, he argues that "if it is established that the Agent creates the burning through His will when cotton contacts the fire, it becomes rationally possible for him not to create the burning when the contact takes place."[55] Al-Ghazālī then reports a possible objection to his answer, which bears quoting in full, since it is in answering it that he introduces the modified Aristotelian causal theory. He writes:[56]

> This leads to the commission of repugnant impossibilities. For if one denies that the effects follow necessarily from their causes and relates them to the will of their Creator, the will having no specific designated course—[a course] that can vary and become multifarious—then let each allow the possibility of his being in the presence of ferocious beasts, raging fires, high mountains, or enemies ready with their weapons to kill him, but that he does not see them because God does not create for him vision [of them]. And if someone leaves a book in his house, let him allow as possible its change on his returning home into a beardless slave-boy, intelligent, busy with his tasks, or into an animal. Again, if he leaves a slave-boy in the house, let him allow the possibility of his changing into a dog, or if he leaves ashes, the possibility of its changing into musk, and let him al-

low the possibility of stone changing into gold and gold into stone.

If asked about any of this, he ought to say: "I do not know what is at the house at present. All I know is that I've left a book in the house which is perhaps now a horse defiling the book room with its urine and its dung, and that I have left in the house a jar of water which may well have turned into an apple tree. For God, exalted be He, is capable of everything, and it is not to be created from the seed—indeed, it is not necessary for the tree to be created from anything. Perhaps God has created things that did not exist previously."

Indeed, if such a person looks at a human being he has not seen before and is asked whether such a human is a creature that was born, let him say that it is not impossible that some fruit in the marketplace has changed into a human, namely, this human, God being capable of everything, and that hence one must hesitate in such matters. This is a mode for which one can go on giving illustrations, but this much is sufficient.

Why then does al-Ghazālī give such vivid illustrations of what the opponent holds to be the absurd consequences of the Ash'arite causal doctrine? This seems to be part of his method of refutation in the *Tahāfut*, namely of presenting the opponent's position in its strongest or at least most persuasive form. Its refutation thereafter would thus become complete and convincing. Al-Ghazālī rejects in no uncertain terms that the above absurdities do follow [57]:

If it were established that that whose existence is possible is such that there cannot be created for man knowledge of its non-existence, then these impossibilities would necessarily follow. We are not, however, rendered skeptical by the illustrations you have given because God created for us the knowledge that He did not enact these possibilities. On the contrary, they are possibilities that may occur or not occur. But the continuous habit of their occurrence repeatedly, one after another, fixes unshakably in our minds the belief in their occurrence according to past habit.

After elaborating on this occasionalist position, he concludes with the statement that what the philosophers have come up with in suggesting the absurd consequences of his causal doctrine is nothing "but sheer vilification," *tashnī' maḥd*. This key expression, however, has been mistranslated

and consequently al-Ghazālī's position has been totally misunderstood and quite wrongly interpreted. It has been mistranslated for example, as "pure absurdity."[58] Al-Ghazālī here is hardly admitting that what the philosopher opponent regards as the absurd consequences of his denial of necessary causal connections do in fact follow. His whole point is that they do *not* follow and hence what the opponent has come up with is nothing but "sheer vilification." One, however, can avoid being subject to such vilifications, *tashnī'āt*—again mistranslated as "reprehensible consequences"[59]—by adopting another theory that would still allow for those miracles rejected by the philosophers as impossible. Al-Ghazālī writes:[60]

The second way, in which there is deliverance from these vilifications, is to admit[61] that fire is created in such a way that if two similar pieces of cotton come into contact with it, it would burn both, making no distinction between them, if they are similar in all respects. With all this, however, we allow as possible that a prophet be cast in the fire without his being burnt, either by changing the character of the fire or by changing the character of the prophet (peace on him). Thus there would come about from God, exalted be He, or from the angels, either a quality in the fire which restricts its warmth to its own body so as not to transcend it—its warmth will thus remain with it and it would still have the form and true nature of fire, but its heat and influence would not go beyond it—or else, there will occur in the body of the prophet a quality which will not change it from being flesh and bone and which would resist the influence of the fire.

One notes in this passage that al-Ghazālī's primary concern is to allow the possibility of the miracle of having a prophet thrown into a fiery furnace survive. He is ready to admit at this point that fire by its nature produces heat and burning and that the human body by nature is subject to this causal action. But he insists on divine intervention that produces the miracle, either by confining the power of the fire to itself, or by creating a quality in the prophet that renders him immune to the action of the fire. Moreover, this divine intervention is an intervention by choice: the divine act is a voluntary act, not a necessitated one. Al-Ghazālī then develops this line of reasoning, showing how this alternative causal theory can explain different kinds of miracles. In the case of some, for example, it is within divine power to accelerate the causal process, allowing the change of a staff into a snake.

In this theory, as noted above, causal powers are restored to natural things. To this extent, the theory can be regarded as Aristotelian. But it is a

modified Aristotelian theory in that it is premised on the concept of divine voluntary action and divine power that can create new causal conditions to produce the miraculous event. It thus shares with the Ash'arite occasionalist doctrine the premise that the divine act is voluntary. But while each of the two theories in and by itself is possible, they remain incompatible. This is because the occasionalist doctrine, unlike the modified Aristotelian theory, does not admit causal powers in inanimate things. The two views, while sharing a common premise regarding the voluntary divine act, are not com-possible. They remain mutually exclusive.

It should be stressed that in introducing the alternative modified Aristotelian theory, al-Ghazālī never abandons the Ash'arite doctrine. More to the point, there are an abundance of indications within the *Tahāfut*—apart from the 17th Discussion—that it is the Ash'arite causal doctrine that he upholds.[62] All of this indicate that the modified Aristotelian theory is introduced simply for the sake of argument, to show that even if one allows causal efficacy in natural things, those scriptural miracles deemed impossible by the philosophers can be shown to be possible. That it is the Ash'arite causal theory to which al-Ghazālī subscribes is conclusively confirmed by the sequel to the *Tahāfut*, the *Iqtiṣād* to which we will now turn.

In the *Iqtiṣād* al-Ghazālī offers two major discussions of causality that are closely related. The first occurs in his exposition and defence of the Ash'arite doctrine of divine power. Here he subjects the Mu'tazilite doctrine of generated acts to criticism and rejects it. The second occurs in his treatment of the concept of *al-ajal*,[63] the individual's appointed time of death. In both discussions, he affirms the Ash'arite occasionalist doctrine that all events are the direct creation of God and that there is no causal interaction between one created thing and another.

Turning to the discussion of divine power, al-Ghazālī makes the point that this attribute is additional to the divine essence.[64] For, if identical, he argues in effect, then the world would proceed as a consequence of this essence and would thus be eternal, which is false. He then makes a main argument to prove that this attribute is universal, that is, that divine power is universally pervasive, and that it is one, not consisting of numerous powers each producing an event.[65] His argument can perhaps be paraphrased as follows:

Everything that is possible, that is, everything that is internally consistent, lies within the domain of divine power. But all possible happenings in the future are potentially infinite. By this al-Ghazālī means that "the crea-

tion of events one after another does not terminate with a limit beyond which the occurrence of an event would be rationally impossible."[66] Now if each one of these possible events requires an individual power to produce it, then the divine power would be fragmented, so to speak. Moreover, since there is the possibility of a limitless, never ending, number of future events, the divine powers productive of these events would be numerically infinite. But this would constitute an actual infinity which is impossible. Hence the divine power is not numerically divisible into infinite powers. It is one power that is universally pervasive, the direct cause of each and every happening.

These happenings include for al-Ghazālī human acts. They include, for example, two kinds of movement, the spasmodic and what we normally regard as the deliberate.[67] Both kinds of movements are created in us by God. The difference is that the spasmodic is created without the power associated with it. The non-spasmodic, however, is created with the power. But this is created power and is not productive of the movement or act associated with it. Rather, the so called effect of this power, is really another concomitant event created by God. What is thought to be the product of the power is acquired for us by God.[68] Otherwise, al-Ghazālī argues, we would have to affirm the Mu'tazilite doctrine that creatures have the power to create. This is contrary to what the pious forebears have held, namely that God alone is the creator of all things.[69] Moreover, it would mean the attribution to the power of creatures acts of which they have no knowledge.[70] Al-Ghazālī here points to the mysteries and complexities of creaturely actions, discussing, for example, in great detail such intricate creations ordinarily attributed to bees. All such creations, he holds in effect, are in reality the direct invention of the all-pervasive divine power.

Al-Ghazālī introduces his criticism of the Mu'tazilite doctrine of generation by putting in the mouth of the opponent a questioning of the Ash'arite doctrine of the pervasiveness of divine power[71]:

> How do you claim the universality of the connection of the [divine] power with the whole of temporal events when most of what there is in the world by way of motions and other things are generated, each being necessarily generated by another? For the movement of the hand, for example, by necessity generates the movement of the ring on the finger and the movement of the hand in the water generates the movement of the water. This is [something which] is observed. Reason also indicates this. For if the movement of the ring and of the water were through the crea-

tion of God, exalted be He, then it would be permissible [for Him] to create the motion of the hand without the motion of the water, which is impossible. The same applies to all generated things with all their divisions.

The concept of generation in the examples given, al-Ghazālī responds, is incomprehensible.[72] Generation means the coming out of one body from another as with the birth of the newborn. Since the examples given as instances of generation are incomprehensible, to say that the generation of the movement of the ring by the movement of the hand is observed is nonsensical. All that one observes is the simultaneous movements. The contradiction of having the hand move without the movement of the ring has nothing to do with generation. It is impossible because it means that two substances, each confined to one space, would occupy the same place.[73] This is similar to the relationships between some of the attributes. The existence of life, for example, is a condition of the existence of knowledge. It is impossible for knowledge to exist without life. But this does not mean that life generates knowledge.

In the case of such concomitants as the burning of the cotton when in contact with fire and the coldness of the hand when touching snow, al-Ghazālī goes on, there are no such conditions. The concomitance here is due to a habitual course ordained by God, a course, however, that in itself is not necessary, and hence one that can be disrupted without contradiction.[74]

Al-Ghazālī reports an answer the opponent may produce: the concept of generation has been misunderstood; all it means is that one thing causes another as, for example, when it is said that snow causes coldness.[75] In responding to this,[76] al-Ghazālī refers us back to his argument of the pervasiveness of divine power. Such a doctrine, as has been shown, he maintains, does not allow the created power in animate things to have real efficacy. What is thought to be the effect of this created power is in actuality, the direct creation of the divine power. If animate beings with created powers have no efficacy, how could inanimate things such as snow possess it? Al-Ghazālī then adds that the concept of generation is full of contradictions, as for example, when its proponents maintain that reflection generates knowledge whereas remembering does not. But these are too numerous to go into, he states. Al-Ghazālī then concludes his criticism with the statement:[77]

> All temporal things, their substances and accidents, those occurring in the entities of the animate and the inanimate, come about through the power of God, exalted be He. He alone holds

the sole prerogative of inventing them. It is not the case that some creatures come about through some others. Rather, all come about through [divine] power.

Turning to the second major discussion of causality in the *Iqtiṣād*, it occurs, as mentioned earlier, in al-Ghazālī's treatment of the question of *al-ajal,* the appointed time of an individual's death. If a person is decapitated, for example, is his death due to the decapitation or to his *ajal*? Al-Ghazālī begins with the following statement:[78]

> With any two things, each of which is not linked with the other and which are then connected in existence, from supposing the negation of the one, the negation of the other does not follow. If Zayd and ʿAmr die together and then we suppose the non-dying of Zayd, then neither the non-dying nor the existence of death of ʿAmr would follow. Similarly, if Zayd dies when the moon is in eclipse, for example, then if we suppose the non-dying of Zayd, the non-eclipsing of the moon would not necessarily follow; and if we suppose the non-eclipsing of the moon, the non-dying of Zayd would not follow since there is no link of the one with the other.

Al-Ghazālī then discusses three types of relationships that obtain between things.[79] The first consists of such spatial relationships involving the existence of one thing above or to the right of another where it would follow that the other would be below or to the left of the first. The second is that of an attribute being a necessary condition for the existence of another—life, for example, being a necessary condition for will and knowledge. He then adds as the third type of causal relationships where when the cause is removed, the effect is removed. More accurately, this happens when the cause is only one. If there are numerous causes, then all these causes would have to be removed for the effect to be removed. In this connection, it should be observed that al-Ghazālī does not deny the principle that every existent other than God is caused. This is basic to his theology.[80] As an Ashʿarite, however, he maintains that there is only one cause, namely the all-pervasive divine power. The statement that if there are many causes then all these would have to be removed in order to remove the effect is a presentation of the position of those who uphold a multiplicity of real causes. That this is not the view he holds becomes clear from his discussion.

Turning to the question of decapitation he writes:[81]

> Killing means the cutting of the neck. This reduces to accidents that are motions of the hand of the striker with the sword, accidents that are the separations in the parts of the neck of the one struck, another accident being associated with these, namely, death.
>
> If there is no bond between the cutting and death, the denial of death would not follow necessarily from the denial of cutting. For these are created together, connectedly in accordance with habit *al-ʿāda*, there being no bond of the one with the other. They are similar to two separate things that are not habitually connected.

Those who believe in the multiplicity of causes, al-Ghazālī then explains, would adduce death to decapitation, but would admit other causes as well. Their position would be true if the belief (*iʿtiqād*) in [such][82] causal reasoning were true (*law ṣaḥḥa iʿtiqād al-taʾlīl*).[83] (One notes here the use of the term *law*, the particle used in conditional sentences expressing either a mere supposition or what is contrary-to-fact.) But with those who believe that "God has the sole prerogative of inventing created things without generation and that no creature is the cause of another creature," al-Ghazālī maintains that "death is a thing which the Lord, exalted be He, alone invented with the cutting." "Hence," he continues, "it does not follow from the supposition of the negation of cutting, the negation of death. And this is the truth (*wa huwa al-ḥaqq*)."[84]

In resolving this question over which there has been much dispute, as al-Ghazālī tells us, we ought to seek the answer from the canon "we've mentioned regarding the universal pervasiveness of the power of God, exalted be He, and the negation of generation."[85] He then writes:[86]

> On this is based the statement that with respect to the individual killed, it ought to be said that he died by his *ajal*, *ajal* meaning the time in which God creates in him his death, regardless of whether this occurs with the cutting of the neck, the occurrence of a lunar eclipse, or the falling of rain. For all these things are for us associated things, not generated acts, except that with some their connection is repeated according to habit, but with some they are not repeated.

Thus in the *Iqtiṣād* there is total denial of the existence of causal powers in created things, whether animate or inanimate. The modified Aristotelian

causal theory introduced in the *Tahāfut* as a possible alternative to the Ashʿarite causal doctrine has no place in al-Ghazālī's theological outlook. It was introduced in the *Tahāfut* simply for the sake of argument—to show that even if causal efficacy in natural things is allowed, those miracles rejected as impossible by the philosophers can still be shown to be possible.

Concluding Remarks

As we have attempted to illustrate in discussing bodily resurrection and causality, in the attempt to understand al-Ghazālī's arguments in the *Tahāfut* one must keep constantly in mind his stated objectives in writing this work. Moreover, in determining his position on causality one must, in addition to the 17th Discussion, consider what he had to say in earlier parts, particularly in the 1st and 3rd Discussions. One must also study the *Iqtiṣād*. It sheds light on the *Tahāfut* and is a key for understanding the intricacies of its lines of reasoning. But the *Iqtiṣād* is important in its own right, as an incisive work of *kalām*.

As indicated earlier, this is a work which al-Ghazālī continued to hold in high regard. For it upholds and defends Sunni belief, this belief being for al-Ghazālī a necessary requirement for following the sufi path. He maintained that those who attain gnosis must never abandon traditional belief. It is partly in this context that one must read his lauding the *Iqtiṣād* in *Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn*,[87] a much later work, written after his *magnum opus*, *Ihyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn*, as being closer than the *kalām* works of others at "knocking at the doors of gnosis."

NOTES

[1] Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) admits the occurrence only of some kinds of miracles. These are causally explainable in terms of his philosophical system. See, for example, Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), *Kitāb al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt*. J. Forget (Leiden, 1892), pp. 216–20.

[2] Mediation for al-Ghazālī does not necessarily mean the attribution of causal efficacy to the mediator and hence the affirmation of secondary causes. Rather, the mediator is the locus of divine action.

[3] Al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa*, ed. M. Bouyges (Beirut, 1927), p. 377, lines 2–3. This reference will be abbreviated in the notes as *TF*.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 3–7, 8–17, 77–78.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 9, 13.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 14–17.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 16, lines 8–12.

[8] Al-Ghazālī, *Mi'yār al-'Ilm*, ed. S. Dunya (Cairo, 1961), pp. 245–66.

[9] Al-Ghazālī, *Fayṣal al-Tafriqa Bayn al-Islām wa al-Zandaqa,* ed. S. Dunya (Cairo, 1961), pp. 182–83. In the *Iqtiṣād* al-Ghazālī states that whatever orally transmitted religious statement that reason judges to be impossible, must be interpreted metaphorically. If, however, reason is unable to prove such religious statements to be either possible or impossible, then these must be taken in their literal sense. Al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtiṣād fī al-I'tiqād*, ed. I. A. Cçubkcçu and H. Atay (Ankara, 1962), p. 212. This work will be abbreviated as *Iqtiṣād.*

[10] *TF*, p. 13, lines 9–11.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 77, line 7–p. 78, line 7.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 13–14.

[13] See Ash'ariyya in Index A of Ibn Rushd, *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, ed. M. Bouyges (Beirut, 1930).

[14] The following are some examples: "According to us, duration and time are created" (*TF*, p. 36, line 1). We say: "The world exists, in the way it exists, with the qualities it has, and in the place where it is, through will. The will is an attribute whose characteristic is to differentiate between one similar and another" (*Ibid.*, p. 37, lines 9–11). See also *TF*, p. 50, line 11–p. 51, line 12, p. 96, lines 11–12. One should also note that he regards the *Tahāfut* as belonging to the genre *kalām*---even though its task is to refute, not affirm doctrine. That he does affirm Ash'arite doctrine, remains his privilege.

[15] *Iqtiṣād*, p. 1, line 14, p. 2, line 12.

[16] For a succinct statement on the date of the *Iqtiṣād,*and its relation to the *Tahāfut*, see G. F. Hourani, "The Chronology of Ghazali's Writings," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 79 (October–December, 1959), p. 228, "A Revised Chronology of al-Ghazālī's Writings," *JAOS,* 104, 2 (April–June, 1984), pp. 293–94. Hourani also holds the view that the *Iqtiṣād* is the sequel to the *Tahāfut*, S. Van Den Bergh, also holds this view; see his translation of Averroes' *The Incoherence of the Incoherence* (2 vols. Oxford, 1954), p. 53, n. 65.5, where he actually substitutes the title *Iqtiṣād* for *Qawā'id.*

[17] Al-Ghazālī, *Kitāb al-Arba'īn fī Uṣūl al-Dīn* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Jundi, 1964), p. 22.

[18] There is no reason for thinking that al-Ghazālī did not continue to subscribe to the Ash'arite articles of faith. But to subscribe to them intellectually and argue for them rationally is one thing—to have an immediate experience that reveals their true meaning is another. This latter is attained by the few through mystical experience, through *dhawq* (literally "taste") and *kashf*, "revelation," "unveiling."

[19] *TF*, p. 305, line 10–p. 306, line 9.

[20] Al-Ash'ari, *Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn*, ed, H. Ritter (Istanbul, 1930), pp. 331–32.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 331, 333–34, al-Sharastānī, *al-Milal wa-Niḥal*, 3 vols., ed. A. F. Muhammad (Cairo, 1949), 1, p. 74.

[22] See, for example, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, *Kitāb al-Rūḥ* (Hyderabad, 1963), p. 310, where he states that the soul "differs from the sensible body in quiddity (*al-māhhiyya*), being a body that is luminous, elevated, light, alive and in motion. It penetrates the substance of the body organs, flowing in them as water flows in roses, oil in olives and fire in charcoal. . . ."

[23] Al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād* (Cairo, 1950), p. 377.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 375–76, 377; *al-Iqtiṣād,* pp. 215–18.

[25] *TF*, p. 303, line 11–p. 304, line 5.

[26] See the author's, "Ghazālī and Demonstrative Science," *Journal of the History of Philosophy,* vol. 111, no. 2 (October, 1965), pp. 183–204.

[27] *TF*, pp. 305–06, but more particularly in the discussion of universals where al-Ghazālī does not concede to the philosophers that the universals, which he tells us, the theologians refer to as "states" (*aḥwāl*), are immaterial and hence requiring an immaterial soul. See *TF*, pp. 328–32, particularly pp. 330–32.

[28] *Ibid.*, 391–92.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 356, line 11–p. 357, line 13.

[30] This objection is one of Avicenna's main arguments against bodily resurrection. Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), *al-Shifā: al-Ilāhiyyāt (Metaphysics)* edition supervised by I. Madkour (Cairo, 1960), 1, 5, pp. 29–36, particularly p. 36. For a translation and commentary on this chapter, see the author's "Avicenna on Primary Concepts," in R. M. Savory and D. Agius (eds.) *Logos Islamikos Studia Islamica in Honorem Georgii Michaelis Wickens* (Toronto, 1984), pp. 219–39, particularly pp. 235–37.

[31] *TF*, pp. 360–62.

[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 362–63.

[33] See the author's "Avicenna and the Problem of the Infinite Number of Souls," *Mediaeval Studies*, XXII (1960), p. 233.

[34] For Avicenna's standard argument against transmigration, the basis of al-Ghazālī's statement in the *Tahāfut*, see *Avicenna's De Anima,* ed. F. Rahman (London, 1959), pp. 223–25, 233–34; *al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīāhat*, pp. 196–97; *al-Najāt* (Cairo, 1938), pp. 183–84, 189. The additional criticism, stated above, that the soul would be in two bodies, is implicit in al-Ghazālī's statement.

[35] *TF*, p. 363 ff.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 364, line 10–p. 365, line 6.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 365, line 6–p. 366, line 8.

[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 366–68.

[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 368–75, particularly, 369–71.

[40] *TF*, p. 363, lines 8–12.

[41] See above note 27.

[42] *Iqtiṣād*, p. 213.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 213, lines 11–12.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 214, lines 7–13.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 215, lines 1–4.

[46] Reading *taqrīr*, as given in the body of text, but the *apparatus criticus* indicates a manuscript reading as *taqdīr*, "hypothesizing."

[47] Al-Ghazālī seems to subscribe to the doctrine that both body and accidents are annihilated and at the resurrection created anew, the recreation being a genuine one, not the creation of a mere replica.

[48] *TF*, p. 277, lines 2–5. For a comment on the syntax of this sentence, see my article, "Ghazali and Demonstrative Science," *op.cit.* p. 187, n. 23. The syntax of the sentence has been misunderstood by earlier translators and the error repeated by subsequent ones. Of the translators, an exception is M. Fakhry, who in his early but pivotal work on the problem of causation in Islam, *Islamic Occasionalism and its Critique by Averroes and Aquinas* (Lon-

don, 1958), shows his correct understanding of the syntax of the sentence when he translates it (p. 60) as follows:

"For any two entities, neither of which is the other, nor the affirmation or the negation of which is implied in the affirmation or the negation of the other, are not necessary concomitants as regards the existence or non-existence of the other."

In the sentence beginning, *kullu shay'ayn laysa hādhā dhālika ...* , the expression, *laysa hādhā dhālika ...* , is a relative clause, as Fakhry correctly understands it, not the predicate of *kullu shay'ayn*, as has been repeatedly and erroneously understood.

The correct translation, as we indicate above, has philosophical implications.

[49] *Iqtiṣād*, p. 222.

[50] *TF*, p. 99, lines 9–10.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 107, lines 1–3 *Iqtiṣād*, pp. 97, 135, 223.

[52] *TF*, p. 278, lines 3–4.

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 278, line 13–p. 279, line 5.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 281, line 10–p. 282, line 1.

[55] *Ibid.*, p 283, lines 6–8.

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 283, line 9–p. 285, line 6.

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 285, lines 7–12.

[58] L. E. Goodman, "Did al-Ghazali Deny Causality?", *Studia Islamica*, XLVII (1978), pp. 105–06. Goodman fails to realize that *tashnī'* is the *maṣdar* of the verb *shanna'a*, the second form of the verb *shanu'a*. Here the misunderstanding of the morphology of a term has lead to a total misunderstanding of al-Ghazālī's argument.

[59] This mistranslation is by S. Van Den Bergh, who also misunderstands the meaning of *tashnī'at*, the plural of *tashnī'*. See Averroes' *The Incoherence of the Incoherence, op. cit.*, I. p. 326.

[60] *TF*, p. 286, line 12–p. 287, line 7.

[61] Admitting a point is sometimes made for the sake of argument, namely, to concede a point which the opponent holds and then show how his conclusion is still invalid, thereby making the refutation more complete. For the various ways in which premises are admitted or conceded, see Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), *al-Shifā: al-Burhān, (Demonstration)* ed. A. E. Affifi (Cairo, 1956), pp. 75–76; also *Kitāb al-Ishārāt*, pp. 82–83.

Al-Ghazālī in arguing that some of the philosophers' scientific theories have no direct bearing on theological matters says: "Let us concede (*fa-l-nussalim*) this to them, dialectically or out of conviction (*TF*, p. 15, lines 4–5)," showing clearly that sometimes he may admit a position "dialectically," not necessarily because he is convinced that it is true.

[62] For the evidence in the *Tahāfut* itself, see the author's "Al-Ghazālī's Second Causal Argument in the 17th Discussion of his *Tahāfut*," in *Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism*, ed. P. Morewedge (Delmar, New York, 1981), pp. 85–112, p. 102.

[63] *Iqtiṣād*, pp. 80–99, 222–25.

[64] *Ibid.*, p. 81.

[65] *Ibid.*, p. 82, lines 2–10.

[66] *Ibid.*, p. 82, lines 3–4.

[67] *Ibid.*, pp. 90–93.

[68] *Ibid.*, pp. 90, 91, but particularly, 92, lines 1–2 and line 5, where the term *kasb*, "acquisition," is used and its usage justified.

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 87, lines 10–11.

[70] *Ibid.*, pp. 87–90.

[71] *Ibid.*, p. 95, line 10–p. 96, line 3.

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 96, line 4 following.

[73] *Ibid.*, p. 97, lines 3–7.

[74] *Ibid.*, p. 97, line 7–p. 98, line 1.

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 98, lines 4–8.

[76] *Ibid.*, p. 98, lines 9–13.

[77] *Ibid.*, p. 99, lines 3–5.

[78] *Ibid.*, p. 222, lines 8–12.

[79] *Ibid.*, pp. 222–23. See also M. Fakhry, *Islamic Occasionalism*, pp. 62–63.

[80] It should be emphasized that the Ash'arites deny that a causal agent by its very nature or essence necessitates its effect. The agent must have the attribute of life and will and its act is voluntary. Strictly speaking there is only one agent, God.

[81] *Ibid.*, p. 223, line 12–p. 224, line 2.

[82] This is suggested by the context.

[83] *Ibid.*, p. 224, line 11.

[84] *Ibid.*, p. 224, lines 7–8.

[85] *Ibid.*, p. 224. lines 12–13.

[86] *Ibid.*, p 224, line 13–p. 225, line 3.

[87] *Op. cit.* [note 17 above], p. 22.